Examining Henry Kissinger's Foreign Policy Record

Written by Will Wigginton

Henry Kissinger: Served as National Security Advisor from 1969-1975, Secretary of State from 1973-1977

A Politician’s Skillset: Even though Kissinger was not an elected official, he had the political correctness of his job down more so than many politicians of his era. Michael Fowler stated that, “As a foreign policymaker, Henry Kissinger was often secretive – sometimes manipulative, devious, a formidable ‘in-fighter’ within U.S. government circles. And, he had this tremendous ego… Kissinger also had the old-style diplomat’s flair for talking in circles, remarking at one press conference: ‘I am not saying that there’s no circumstances where we would not use force.’”

Controversial Personality: Although Kissinger’s brashness would serve him well in his diplomatic career, he made quite a few enemies along the way. According to Bruce Jentleson, Kissinger “was offered a faculty position at Harvard, although not the prestigious Society of Fellows to which he aspired. This was in part due to the reputation he was developing among peers and faculty as arrogant and overly ambitious.”

A Politician in an Advisor’s Body: Another example of Kissinger acting like a politician was seen during his time serving in the Lyndon Johnson Administration. Kissinger “had ‘grave doubts’ about Nixon. But as the campaign went on, he leaked information to the Nixon campaign about Johnson’s plans for a Vietnam bombing halt, trying to counter any ‘October surprise’ boost for Democratic candidate, Hubert Humphrey.” So, not only was Kissinger at times arrogant and more ambitious than necessary, he also acted effectively as a spy to obtain his goals of having a substantial role in a presidential administration.

The International Context:

The Sino-Russian Rivalry: In spite of China and Russia being the two greatest communist powers of the time, they clearly held severe animosity towards each other. This mostly came from the Soviets hardly helping Mao’s forces during the Chinese Civil War, suspicion of the other, territorial disputes, small skirmishes at the border between the states, and general unsteadiness in rhetoric between the two sides. Kissinger would make sure to capitalize on these faltering relations while working in the Nixon Administration.

Unrest in the Middle East: Even though balancing relations in the Middle East was a major foreign policy prerogative of Kissinger, there was too much unrest in the area for even the United States to keep under control. Prior to his time serving in Nixon’s Administration, there was great conflict in the region, especially between Egypt and Israel. This conflict would come to a breaking point with the October War of 1973, which saw the Egyptians launch a surprise invasion of Israel, creating a need for continued U.S. intervention in the region.

The Palestine Question: This issue of creating a state for Palestinians was a major issue during the time Kissinger served in the government, and is still unresolved today. Palestinian terrorist groups, mainly in the form of the PLFP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) or PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) were very aggressive in the Middle East during this time, playing a part in the conflicts between Arab states and Israel. Furthermore, these Palestinian terrorists even took Israeli children hostage, sparking a retaliatory attack by Israel, almost squandering Kissinger’s peace measures in the region. The issues with these groups would spill over into succeeding administrations.

Allied Improvements: America at this time was clearly the superpower of the West. However, its allies were working increasingly to catch up to them. According to Engel, et al., “Europe (led by West Germany) and Japan were prospering at the expense of an increasingly lethargic American economy. European allies, moreover, were moving away from the protective U.S. nuclear umbrella and directly challenging Washington’s leading role in the Atlantic alliance…” While it was positive from the American perspective that its allies were becoming stronger, mainly to counter Soviet influence, it didn’t help that they were acting increasingly independent of the U.S. in the international setting. Maintaining and obtaining allies would become a key factor of Kissinger’s time in the government.

Key Foreign Policies:

Détente: Relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War were obviously as tense a conflict could be without becoming a hot war. Kissinger attempted to change this by cooling off relations with the USSR. As a result, the policy of détente was born. In Kissinger’s own words, détente was not intended to abandon “the ideological struggle, but simply trying–tall order as it was–to discipline it by precepts of national interest.” So, the policy was not intended to let go of the enhancement of resources or attempt to usurp the other superpower in strength, nor did it “prevent resistance to Soviet expansion; on the contrary, it fostered the only possible psychological framework for such resistance. Nixon knew where to draw the line against Soviet adventure whether it occurred directly or through proxy…” Furthermore, according to John Lewis Gaddis, the goal of this “was nothing less than to change the Soviet Union’s conception of international relations, to integrate it as a stable element into the existing world order, and to build on the resulting equilibrium a ‘structure of peace’ that would end once and for all that persistent abnormality known as the ‘Cold War.’”

Triangular Diplomacy: I consider this to be an extension of détente, but under a larger umbrella. Triangular diplomacy was a policy implemented by Kissinger and Nixon to counterbalance the communist powers of China and Russia. Furthermore, Kissinger did not want to project an anti-authoritarian rhetoric. He and Nixon were not into promoting democracy abroad, they wanted to avoid criticism of both authoritarians and communists. Basically, Kissinger wanted to use the rivalry between China and Russia against them. Relations were eventually opened between America and China in order to spark jealousy from the USSR, which would cause them to also seek better relations with the United States.

Balance-of-Power Politics: Kissinger, with his historical background, saw balance-of-power politics as good policy. In short, the concept of balance-of-power is for major powers to act in ways to balance them against contemporary powers, hence the name. In his era, the only true rival of the U.S. were the Soviets. So, according to John Lewis Gaddis, Kissinger saw “What might appear as a loss in one area–the stalemate in Vietnam, for example, or the Soviet attainment of strategic parity–could be compensated for by gains in others–an opening to China, or a negotiated settlement on arms control. It was the overall calculus of power that was important, not the defeats or victories that might take place in isolated theaters of competition.”

Shuttle Diplomacy: A key aspect of Kissinger’s foreign policy goals resided in the Middle East. Following the introduction of Anwar Sadat, the new leader of Egypt, Kissinger sought not only to cultivate greater relations with the Egyptians, but to consolidate American relations with as much of the Middle East as possible. So, Kissinger launched his shuttle diplomacy policy, otherwise known as peace, step-by-step. The concept was for Kissinger to travel to a myriad of Middle Eastern states in an attempt to solve solutions to smaller problems in order to create rapport with the leaders of such states, hopefully then creating and preserving any semblance of peace in the region.

Positive Achievements:

Middle Eastern Negotiations: Shuttle diplomacy, while deserving of some criticism, was a mostly successful endeavor by Kissinger. He and the Nixon Administration as a whole were able to end the October War of 1973. Kissinger in specific was able to convince Nixon to get Israel to stand down in its conflict with Egypt, mainly for the reason that the Soviets threatened intervention on behalf of Egypt if the conflict was not concluded. This was especially important as it ended another contemptuous Cold War period and avoided the real possibility of nuclear conflict. Since America was able to play the role of mediator, along with the increased communication with the Soviets as a result of détente, Kissinger deserves much credit for contributing to peace in the region. Furthermore, Kissinger was able to convince Middle Eastern states, specifically Syria, to lift the oil embargo that was placed on the U.S. during the October War, which had greatly hindered the American economy. The embargo lift also occurred only because Kissinger was able to help bring peace in the Syrian-Israeli conflict, helping both sides come to a peaceful resolution.

Détente: There are several pros and cons of détente, meaning that this will go in the sections covering Kissinger’s achievements and drawbacks. The positives of this policy were The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) occurred with the Soviet Union, which were discussions on which areas they and America could stop actively competing, American commitments across the globe also phased down, U.S. foreign assistance programs were either cut or reduced, the military budget was trimmed, and the push for gaining allies was also ended, making this solid list of accomplishments of détente. This policy came in part from the struggles in Vietnam. Kissinger himself even said that “If the Vietnam war had taught us anything, it was that a military confrontation could be sustained only if the American people were convinced there was no other choice.”

The Opening with China: While this was a risky endeavor, the implementation of triangular diplomacy through the opening of relations with China was a savvy foreign policy move, proving Kissinger’s understanding of the dynamic between the Soviets and Chinese. Kissinger saw these relations as risky, yet worthwhile, stating: “... the process we have now started will send enormous shockwaves around the world. It may panic the Soviet Union into sharp hostility. It could shake Japan loose from its heavily American moorings. It will cause a violent upheaval in Taiwan. It will have a major impact on our other Asian allies, such as Korea and Thailand. It will increase the already substantial hostility in India. Some quarters may seek to sabotage the summit over the coming months.” However, Kissinger thought this move was necessary, as ignoring the growing economic power of China, along with its perceived potential, would have been irresponsible. Finally, even though Nixon resigned following the Watergate scandal, Zhou Enlai passed because of cancer, and Mao died as well, relations were still established and furthered during the Carter Administration. “On January 1, 1979, with Jimmy Carter as U.S. president and Deng Xiaoping rehabilitated and now in charge in China, full diplomatic relations were established. Over the decades since, many aspects of the relationship have been developed. China and the United States have cooperated on some issues.” So, even though much of the relations were established following Kissinger’s time in the government, he still deserves credit for opening the door to allow future administrations to further relations.

Negative Drawbacks:

Failures of Détente: Although the policy as a whole contributed to better relations with the Soviets, it simply was not effective enough to consider it an outright success, with some of it falling outside the scope of the Nixon Administrations power. According to Raymond Garthoff, “cooperation developed in a number of areas, particularly from 1972 to 1975, it never supplanted ongoing competition nor offered sufficient guarantee against renewed confrontation. From the American perspective, one important cause of the decline of détente was the active Soviet role in Africa and South Asia after 1975.” Moreover, many of the issues with détente stemmed from a confusion from both sides, not only regarding what détente meant, but how it would be implemented. “The American leaders saw it (in Kissinger’s words) as a way of ‘managing the emergence of Soviet power’ into world politics in an age of nuclear parity. The Soviet leaders envisaged it as a way of managing the transition of the United States from its former superiority to a more modest role in world politics in an age of nuclear parity. Thus each saw itself as the manager of a transition of the other.” When I first read this, I thought it must have been a typo. How badly could Kissinger botch the interpretation of détente for the Soviets to perceive it as America effectively giving up in the Cold War? Furthermore, if he did properly establish the policy’s boundaries, how much more effective could it have been? I understand that there were some aspects of détente that were out of his control, but not controlling the policy direction became a true detriment to its ability to succeed.

Unnecessary Entanglements: Remember the aforementioned oil embargo that Kissinger was able to have lifted from Syria? Well, that was only started because of increased American intervention in the Middle East. While Israel was obviously a key ally in the region, the lengths Kissinger went to not only have them stand down when conflicts got out of hand, but the damage to America’s domestic life and relations with the Soviets made his actions grossly irresponsible. Think of it this way: America effectively created another proxy war and arms race with the Soviets, a concept which Kissinger had much experience with because of Vietnam, to protect one state in the region against an aggressor. You would think that America would have learned by that point that engaging in acts such as that were not worth it, even if they were only helping through monetary aid. While Kissinger was able to remedy the issues he created, he deserves to be knocked for his “shuttle diplomacy” having some major shortcomings, especially for the American taxpayer.

Vietnam: A recurring issue of several presidential administrations in this era came from policies toward Vietnam. Nixon ensured the public during his presidential campaign that America would quickly get itself out of Vietnam, which was a flat out lie. While there were some military conflicts in Vietnam that encouraged Nixon and Kissinger to delay taking themselves out of the war, it was extremely bad policy. I’m sure that Kissinger thought that withdrawing honorably was the main way to maintain America’s reputation while also conceding in the conflict, but it only made the issue of withdrawing worse. Becoming dragged into a conflict for several more years was wrong and irresponsible. Kissinger did not have the power Nixon had to end things, but his influence in foreign affairs was palpable enough to make a difference . If he did not attempt to speed up the process, then neither would Nixon. Therefore, he deserves a large portion of the blame for failing to get out of Vietnam in a timely manner.

Catered to Authoritarians: Kissinger’s help in opening relations with China, while mostly a positive, is just another example of his catering to oppressive governments. China just may have been the least egregious example. According to Anthony Lewis, Kissinger’s “Ignorance and ineptitude marked his policy in much of the rest of the world. In Cyprus, his blundering led to human tragedy and left America’s reputation damaged in both Greece and Turkey. His insensitivity to Japanese feelings had traumatic effects on a most important ally.” Furthermore, “In dealing with Portugal and its African territories Mr. Kissinger decided in succession that (1) the Portuguese were in Africa to stay, (2) the U.S. should help Portugal’s dictatorship, (3) after the dictatorship’s fall the Communists were bound to prevail in Portugal, and (4) the U.S. could decide the outcome in Angola by covert aid. That parade of folly was matched in his African policy generally: years of malign neglect, then last-minute intervention for majority rule in Rhodesia.” Finally, Kissinger supported many brutally oppressive violent regimes in Chile and the Philippines, and ultimately showed little remorse for the people living in those lands who had to face the consequences.

A Bad Person?: As stated before, Kissinger had grandiose ambitions, and understood his intellect, which led him to being an arrogant man who rubbed many people the wrong way. This arrogance may have extended into his time serving in the federal government. Anthony Lewis stated that “His conduct in the wiretapping of his own staff gave ugly insight into his character. He provided names for investigation–and then, when the story came out, wriggled and deceived in order to minimize his role. He never expressed regret, even to those who had been closest to him, for the fact that their family conversations had been overheard for months. But when someone ransacked his garbage, he said his wife had suffered ‘grave anguish.’” So, while Kissinger held much knowledge and had a knack for diplomacy, he backed that with a pompous attitude that portrayed him to those he dealt with as an unpleasant man.

Final Grade: C+/ While the amount of negatives regarding Kissinger’s foreign policy career outweigh the number of positives, I don’t feel as if it should drop him below a C+. In a vacuum, his foreign policy initiatives had some success. His policy of détente, while certainly not foolproof, laid the groundwork for better relations with the Soviets going forward. His peace initiatives, while backfiring on America domestically and internationally, did end up mostly successful. The opening of relations with China was a positive development, although it alienated many of America’s allies. In short, Kissinger was a smart National Security Advisor and Secretary of State with some great ideas, but lacked foresight on the implications and consequences of his policies.

References:

Michael Fowler, “Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger.”
“The Era of Détente,” in Engel, et al., eds, America in the World: A History in Documents from the War with Spain to theé War on Terror, 281-82.
“Henry Kissinger on the Meaning of Détente,” Chester, ed., Scope and Variety, Vol. II, 480-81.
Henry Kissinger, “The Opening to China,” in Engel, et al, eds., America in the World: A History in Documents from the War with Spain to the War on Terror (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 295-97.
“The Journalist Anthony Lewis Blasts Kissinger’s Record, 1977,” in Merrill and Paterson, eds., Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, 5th ed., Vol. II, (Boston, MA; New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company), 494-95.
Bruce Jentleson, “Henry Kissinger, Zhou Enlai, and the U.S.-China Opening, 1971-72,”The Peacemakers: Leadership Lessons from Twentieth-Century Statesmanship (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company), 4-30.
John Lewis Gaddis, “Nixon, Kissinger, and Détente,” Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, 2nd ed., (Oxford University Press), 272-306.
Raymond Garthoff, “Why Détente Failed,” in Merrill and Paterson, eds., Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, 5th ed., Vol. II (Boston, MA; New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company), 511-27.